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I. Introduction
Megachurches are thriving in religious markets at a time when Americans are
asserting their ability as consumers of religious products to engage in religious switching.
Survey results from the latest Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2008) study of the
U.S. religious landscape find that religious affiliation in the U.S. is very diverse and
extremely fluid. Kosmin and Keysar (2006) find that individuals are not only
increasingly changing their church membership, but also their denominational affiliation,
or deciding not to attend services at all.
The increased trend of religious switching allows some churches to gain attendees
while others lose attendees. In the five years between 2000 and 2005, the number of
megachurches in the U.S. doubled, growing to 1,250. At the same time average
attendance at megachurches grew 57%, from 2,279 to 3,585 (Thumma, Travis, and Bird,
2005). Taken together, these facts suggest that megachurches are successfully competing
with other churches to attract and retain members.
This paper examines the seeker-oriented megachurch which have recently grown
in number and often come to mind when megachurches are discussed (e.g., Bill Hybels
Willow Creek Community Church in Illinois, or Rick Warren’s Saddleback Church in
Orange County, CA). Seeker-oriented megachurches typically target religious refugees,
or seekers, in order to grow. These individuals either were never members of a church,
or were members of a church but for a variety of reasons no longer actively affiliate with
it. Some do not attend services or participate in other ways, but maintain an affiliation in
name only, while others have switched to identifying with no religion at all. Rick
Warren deliberately built Saddleback by targeting seekers (Warren, 1995).
Iannacconne (1994) employs a club good model to describe the success of
relatively strict denominations. He argues that the satisfaction an individual receives
from participating in a religion is, in part, a function of how much other attendees also
participate. He makes the case that strict churches (churches that require significant self
sacrifice or stigmatization) enjoy a competitive advantage over liberal denominations by
minimizing free riding. The logic being that those inclined to free riding would not
attend a church that has such high expectations of active engagement with the church. As
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a result, strict churches will create incentives that promote full participation among its
members, thereby raising everyone’s utility.
The success of seeker-oriented megachurches, which typically have low
commitment expectations for new members, raises the question of what strategy and
organizational form they employ to attract and retain these seekers while still fulfilling
the needs of members who have a deeper connection to the church. This paper evaluates
a potential strategy megachurches may pursue to signal the high quality experience they
can provide to seekers. It suggests that the church requires little of seekers in terms of
time, effort, and donations early in their affiliation with the church. This allows the
seekers to attend services anonymously as free riders, providing them an opportunity to
see if what the megachurch offers fits their needs. It also suggests that after the seeker
consumes the church’s religious product and discovers a good fit, the church can then
increase its expectations and require more time, effort, and donations of the new attendee,
thereby reducing on going free riding while still maintaining membership. Taken
together, these suggest that the megachurch organizes itself differently than other
churches in order to accommodate the varying needs of an individual at different stages
of their affiliation with the church. Using the FACT (2000) survey, we show that the
model’s outcomes are consistent with stylized facts suggested by the survey responses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an
overview of trends in religious switching in the U.S. as well as a general overview of
characteristics of megachurches. Section III presents a model of quality signaling to
explain how megachurches successfully attract and retain seekers. Section IV evaluates
the model’s predictions in light of survey responses comparing megachurches to nonmegachurches and section V concludes.

II. Successful Churches, Religious Trends in the U.S., and Megachurches
Thumma, Travis, and Bird (2005), Bird (2007), and Thumma and Travis (2007)
represent the most comprehensive surveys of megachurches and also allow for
comparisons of megachurches to non-megachurches. Thumma and Travis (2007)
estimate that there are 1,250 megachurches in a market of 335,000 congregations. This
number represents a 100% growth between 2000 and 2005. Such growth is also
2

continuing as they estimate that approximately 100 new megachurches are established
each year.
This paper specifically focuses on the seeker-oriented megachurch. These have
been on the rise since the 1990s and often come to mind when megachurches are
discussed. Rick Warren’s Saddleback church is likely one of the best known examples of
a seeker-oriented megachurch. These megachurches attempt to appeal to individuals
previously turned off by organized religion, trying to connect with people who have
abandoned or have remained outside of a traditional faith. They often downplay
denominational affiliation and traditional religious services. Instead, they rely on a
modern look (e.g., a mall or college campus), have music driven by drums and electric
guitars, and frequently employ multimedia during a service.
Churches active in the market for followers will naturally compete with one
another to gain members. Results from both the Pew study of the U.S. religious
landscape (2008) and Kosmin and Keysar’s (2006) study of the U.S. religious
marketplace find strong evidence that individuals are employing their rights as consumers
to switch religious affiliation or even abandon religion altogether. The Pew study finds
that 28% of American adults have left the faith in which they were raised for another
faith or left religion altogether. 1 Further, the survey finds that 16.1% of American adults
are unaffiliated with any religion. This proportion is even larger for the younger
demographic: for eighteen to twenty-nine years olds, a full 25% identify themselves as
unaffiliated. Of all U.S. adults claiming no affiliation, the split between those that are
“religious unaffiliated” (people that say religion is somewhat or very important in their
lives yet have no affiliation) and “secular unaffiliated” (people that say religion is not
important in their lives) is nearly the same (5.8% vs. 6.3%).
Kosmin and Keysar (2006) further note that there is a significant group of adults
that identify with a church but do not affiliate. They estimate that 81 percent of
American adults identify with a religious group, but just over one-half live in households
in which someone is currently a member of a church. They also comment that 30 percent
of those who affiliate with a religion have no tie to a congregation.
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If we allow for a switch from one form of Protestantism to another, this statistic rises to 44%.
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These surveys suggest that, in addition to those who declare themselves as not
belonging to any religion, there are many adults who affiliate in name only, but have no
ties to actually attending a particular service. Individuals belonging to these groups
(religious unaffiliated and those having left a religion) are the key focus of seekeroriented megachurches in their efforts to evangelize and grow.
Given the increased trend of religious switching and the pool of people who are
less connected to a religion, Thumma (1996) suggests megachurches are well poised for
growth. As churches exist in an increasingly dynamic religious environment of
empowered consumers, the megachurch has formed itself as a flexible institution.
Thumma (1996) argues that megachurches are different than other spiritual organizations
in that they demonstrate a new pattern of congregational life that changes with American
society. In addition to the characteristics mentioned before, megachurches typically offer
multiple services, employ different styles of services to target various interests in their
congregation, and some even have multiple branches to serve their members.
Megachurch leaders often employ business models and poll people to better understand
what potential and actual members want. As a religious organization these practices
allow them to excel at intentionally instituting procedures to help newcomers become
integrated in the church while not alienating members who have deepened their affiliation
with the church (Thumma and Travis, 2007).
While evangelical, many megachurches downplay their denomination affiliation,
at least while hosting activities that are intended for new(er) attendees. As Rick Warren
notes (p. 199), Saddleback is doctrinally and financially affiliated with the Southern
Baptist Convention (SBC). However, due to his concern that widespread misperceptions
about the SBC would inhibit seekers from attending, he decided on a strategy to attract
the seekers first and only later educate them about the SBC. His argument is that after
seekers have found a good fit between their needs and what the church offers they will be
open to be educated about the SBC. Unlike other churches, megachurches are organized
to encourage growth by allowing the new attendee to participate as a ‘free rider’ with
very little or no expectation to tithe, volunteer time, or even learn about the church’s
doctrines. However, Warren is careful to note that the free riding cannot continue
indefinitely. As he states, Saddleback church requires, “…a major commitment from
4

those who want to join our Church” (p. 54).

Thus, once attendees deepen their

connection with the church, significant expectations are placed on their behavior in terms
of tithing, volunteering, etc..
This approach provides an interesting case to consider in light of past work
examining how doctrinal constraints impact the organizational structure of a church.
Allen (1995) develops a one-to-one mapping linking organization form (congregational,
denominational, and hierarchical) to doctrinal structure (individualistic, doctrinal,
prophetic). He shows, for example, that the Quakers have a democratic congregational
organizational form that matches their individualistic doctrinal structure. This is in
contrast to, for example, Jehovah Witnesses who have a hierarchical organizational
structure and a prophetic doctrinal structure. In each case the doctrinal structure places a
constraint on the organizational structure the church employs.
Mao and Zech (2002) extend Allen’s (1995) work in a game theoretic approach to
allow a continuum of organizational structures to be consistent with a church’s doctrine
as opposed to Allen’s one to one mapping. Their analysis shows how the structure
chosen is affected by the extent to which a church’s members are willing to sacrifice their
organizational preferences to maintain doctrinal beliefs. Specifically, they recognize that
choosing an organizational form to attract new members may occur at the expense of
losing existing members.
Seeker-oriented megachurches are interesting to study in this light since they deliberately
vary their organizational structure to accommodate the perceived needs of seekers, and
have very different expectations of new attendees relative to members of the megachurch.
As Thumma (1996) suggests, megachurches have directly responded to changes in our
culture and in a sense accommodate it with a distinct and deliberate response in terms of
how they are organized, initiate programs, and influence member relations. Thus, they
do not choose an organizational structure. Rather, they effectively choose multiple
organizational structures to accommodate the varying needs of people at different stages
of their relationship with the church.
The organizational approach taken by seeker-oriented megachurches to attract
seekers often leads to a common misconception that megachurches are a “low
commitment” religion where members join with limited contributions of time, effort, or
5

money and that their level of commitment never grows. It is true that lower ascriptive
loyalties combined with megachurches’ efforts to provide a personalized religious
message have allowed them to reach out to seekers in order to provide a church with low
entry costs that speaks to individual needs. In fact, many seeker-oriented megachurches
make significant efforts along these lines to become the path by which these individuals
reconnect with God. However, though no commitment is initially expected, at some
point the church increases its expectations of those who attend. In the context of Mao
and Zech (2002), this organizational approach would likely fail, as members with high
commitment would be inclined to leave the church because of the church accommodating
free riders. It appears, however, that this strategy ultimately works because many
attendees eventually become members, leading to the megachurch growth discussed
earlier. According to Thumma, Travis, and Bird (2005), megachurches are among the
most successful churches today in attracting and retaining members, suggesting that they
foster on-going commitment and involvement of their members.
If we consider the apparent strategy megachurches employ when requiring no
commitment early, but more after the individual is connected to the church, it seems as
though the megachurch is drawing new members in by charging a low price to experience
the religious product, and then increasing the price after the individual recognizes the
quality of the religious product and deepens their commitment to the church.
This process is clearly a different approach and organizational form than that
taken by traditional churches seeking to minimize free riding by requiring significant
commitments by members throughout their association with the church. Iannaccone
(1992, 1994) makes the case that strict churches are the ones most likely to grow and
succeed in a competitive marketplace. He argues that participating in a religion is like a
club good in that the utility an individual derives from participating is a function of,
among other things, the degree to which others also participate. The public good aspect,
however, of such an activity can engender free-riding. Thus, to minimize such behavior,
a strict church will attract committed members and thereby minimize the free-riding
problem. Consequently, strict churches will be successful while lax churches will
weaken. Kosmin and Keysar’s (2006) results find some support for Iannaccone’s
predictions. On the one hand, strict, or high cost, groups such as Born Again Christians
6

and Pentecostals, have indeed seen significant growth. On the other hand, less strict or
lower cost groups such as Presbyterians, United Churches of Christ, and Methodists have
declining memberships.

Megachurches, however, present an interesting case in that

they seem to encourage free riding, at least early in a person’s association with the
church, and yet are growing.

III. A Model of Quality Signaling to Attract Seekers
Given the above discussion, we view a seeker-oriented megachurch as a unique religious
organization whose strategy is to market to the needs of religious refugees, or seekers,
who are dissatisfied with their previous religious affiliation. To target these individuals,
the seeker-oriented megachurch must find a way to signal their commitment to the
quality, or fit, of their religious product in order to attract a seeker to the service. Only by
bringing seekers into the megachurch, does the megachurch have the opportunity to
demonstrate that it can be a high-quality fit with the seeker’s tastes and preferences and
begin the process of deepening that individual’s relationship with the church.
It is precisely this challenge of signaling that provides our motivation for
characterizing the apparent pricing strategy of the seeker-oriented megachurch within a
quality signaling model. (For extensive coverage of signaling, see Kreps and Sobel
1994.) Specifically, we adapt Tirole’s (1995) two-period quality signaling model to
illustrate how a megachurch might distinguish itself from non-megachurches in its ability
to offer a high-quality fit experience that is dissimilar from that of a competing
organization that offers a low-quality fit for the seeker.
We assume the seekers the megachurch hopes to attract are religious refugees.
That is, individuals who either have no religious affiliation, or state an affiliation but do
not attend religious services. In this sense, we are not making a comment on the actual
quality of various churches or denominations. Instead, we use the notion of quality or fit
in the model to suggest a match between the seeker’s tastes and preferences and the
religious product offered by a church (or producer). We identify two qualities of fit of a
religious good. The high-quality fit closely matches and satisfies the tastes and
preferences of some of these seekers while the low-quality fit is not a match for any of
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the seekers. (Of course the low-quality fit religious good may well satisfy the tastes and
preferences of the non-seekers, but this is not the market segment we are examining.)
The interaction between the church and the seeker is structured such that the
church charges a price for an individual to consume the religious product in each period
of the two-period game (p1 and p2). We interpret the “price” of a religious product along
the lines of Ekelund, et al. (2006) as the full price of religion. This includes the time
required to attend, effort required to fulfill church expectations such as service to others,
and donations and tithing expected by the church. The individual has the following
utility function:

U=

αs – pt
0

if the individual attends the church, or
if the individual does not attend,

(1)

where t = 1, 2, α is a taste parameter, s denotes the quality of fit, and p is the full price.
The taste parameter α is distributed over the population of individuals with the
cumulative distribution f(α). The population is normalized at unity. For simplicity, we
assume there are no new entrants of consumers or producers in period two.
There are two incumbent producers of distinct religious products from which the
seeker may choose. In this setting, the high-quality fit product, sh, is a match for some
seekers, while the low-quality fit product, sl, not a match for any seeker. (We therefore
implicitly set the value of sl equal to zero.) The quality of fit of the religious product
offered by each producer is known to the producer but not known to the individual—prior
to consuming the product in the first period—and can only be learned by attending a
church and determining if the religious good is a high-quality fit or low-quality fit. In this
sense, the religious product is an experience good.
Let γ denote the a priori probability that either product is a match for the
individual. Accordingly, γ is the proportion of repeats in the second period at the highquality fit producer. Because the low-quality fit is not a match for any seeker, the lowquality fit producer does not have any individual that repeats in the second period. For
simplicity, only those who attend in period 1 can attend in period 2. Thus, in the second
period when quality is known to seekers, the high-quality fit producer will provide a
8

service to a proportion, γ, of those who attend in period one, while the low-quality church
will not. The high- and low-quality fit products are produced at different unit costs
denoted as ch and cl respectively. We make two assumptions on costs. First, it is assumed
that the unit cost of producing the high-quality fit product is greater than that of the lowquality fit product, ch ≥ cl. Second, it is economically efficient to produce that high
quality good, and so αsh ≥ ch.
For simplicity, the church and the individual have the same discount rate, δ,
which is used to discount the second-period “profits” of the high-quality fit producer. It
follows that the total discounted profit of the high-quality fit producer is:
Πh = (p1 – ch) + γδ(p2-ch) ≥ 0.

(2)

The discounted profit of the high-quality fit producer depends not only on costs of
production and the discount rate, but also the prices charged in each period and the
proportion of satisfied or repeat individuals. The first period price is important because
the seeker-oriented church needs to attract potential members in period one so they might
learn about the quality of the product. It follows that if the low-quality fit producer
mimics the first-period price strategy of the high-quality fit producer and charges price
p1, the low-quality fit producer’s profit, which occurs in the first period only, is equal to:
Πl = p1 – cl ≥ 0.

(3)

Equation (3) represents the cost advantage to the low-quality fit producer. To ensure that
the low-quality fit producer does not profit at the high-quality fit producer’s expense, the
high-quality producer would ensure in period one that p1 ≤ cl. Subtracting (3) from (2)
therefore yields the constraint faced by the high-quality fit producer:
Πh = γδ(p2-ch) – (ch – cl) ≥ 0.

(4)

Two important points emerge from (4). First, in words, in order for the high-quality fit
producer to use the first-period price as a signaling mechanism, it must be that the
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discounted profits from repeat individuals exceeds the cost differential. 2 Second, it
follows that for the inequality to hold, it must be that the second-period full-information
price that the profit-maximizing high-quality fit producer would charge, αsh, is greater
than unit cost, ch.
In light of the above constraints, the optimal strategy for the high quality church is
to price the religious product it offers equal to the low quality church’s cost in the first
period. Under these circumstances, a low quality church would not mimic a high quality
church because it could not earn a positive profit doing so. Thus, the high quality church
can signal its commitment to offer a high-quality fit product and thereby separate itself
from a low quality church by charging a low quality price in the first period (p1 = cl).
The high quality church could recoup (at least) its first period loss in the second
period by charging a sufficiently high price. In the second period, the profit-maximizer
can charge a full-information price equal to αsh. The first component of (4), γδ(p2-ch),
implies p2 = αsh ≥ ch ≥ c0 = p1, and, therefore, period two price must be higher than
period one price. In other words, period one price is an introductory price as it is lower
than the full information price charged in the second period. Thus, the church will expect
its attendees to pay more in the second period when the returning attendee has discovered
that the church provides a good fit. This may take the form of higher expectations of
monetary offerings, higher expectations of participation, and higher expectations of
personal practices (e.g., behaving in a manner consistent with church teachings).Note that
the quality of the product, sh, is an important determinant of the price difference between
period one and period two and, therefore, profit as well. Hence, the profit-maximizing
producer does not scrimp on quality in the second period.

IV. Empirical Evidence
The model suggests that megachurches succeed in attracting and retaining seekers
by requiring little of them early in their association with the church, but after the high
quality (good fit) of their services is experienced, the church can expect more of the
If Пh = γδ(p2 – ch) – (ch – cl) < 0, the high-quality producer would have an incentive to produce the lowquality fit product, would always charge cl and, therefore, could not use price as a signal of quality and
commitment.
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attendees. Thus, the price a seeker-oriented megachurch charges is low initially, but then
rises after the quality of the service is known. 3
Given that megachurches have only recently garnered significant attention among
academics, empirical researchers have been hindered by a shortage of data. The data
employed in this study come from the Faith Communities Today 2000 (FACT2000)
survey. The data were made available by the Association of Religion Data archives,
www.TheArda.com, and were collected by David Roozen. 4
Given the importance of the FACT2000 survey, we briefly describe the survey
before we evaluate the empirical results. The FACT2000 survey is the largest survey of
congregations in the U.S. It is also allows for the first systematic study of megachurches.
FACT(2000) allows researchers to investigate a variety of congregational characteristics
including their number and style of services, programming efforts, and many aspects of
congregational life. Bird (2007) notes that the survey measures 280 variables, and the
responses represent 41 denominations and faith groups (approximately 90% of all U.S.
congregations and faiths). The survey averaged over a 50% return rate, resulting in over
14,000 returned surveys.
Our data analysis consists of comparing the responses of megachurches to nonmegachurches on a number of issues related to our hypotheses on pricing. To conduct
the analysis, we first separate megachurches from non-megachurches. We apply the
definition of megachurches being Protestant churches with weekly attendees of 2000 or
more. FACT(2000) classifies denominations as belonging to one of the following
categories: Liberal Protestant, Moderate Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, Historic
Black, Catholic and Orthodox, or other. Our megachurch subset thus includes liberal,
moderate, and evangelical Protestant congregations with 2000 or more attendees. The
non-megachurch sample includes Catholic and Orthodox, Historic Black churches, and
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It would be ideal to test the model by comparing prices of different services to costs of providing services
at megachurches and non-megachurches. Given that no such data are publicly available, we focus on data
that allow us to infer relative prices of attending megachurches and non-megachurches.
4
We are indebted to Warren Bird whose 2007 Ph.D. thesis made us aware of the data set and who also
applied similar tests to some of these questions. Our results support and extend his results.
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“other”. 5 Of these returns, the survey received 192 usable responses from megachurches
and 14,109 usable responses form non-megachurches.
To examine the change in prices, it simplifies our analysis to know that
megachurches essentially offer services to non-members at close to a zero price. Warren
(1995) notes that as he established Saddleback, during offerings he stated that the
offering was only expected of members of the church family. Non-members were and
are not expected to give. Both Warren (1995) and Thumma and Travis (2007) mention
that seeker-oriented megachurches understand seekers want anonymity and pastors wish
to provide the required anonymity. Naturally, megachurches would then not make
requirements of additional time and effort of seekers getting acquainted with the church
early in their affiliation. Thus, what remains to add empirical content to our model is to
consider the available data to investigate other measurable ways in which the whole price
of affiliation is low to new or non-members and then rises as a person’s affiliation with
the megachurch deepens.
As mentioned above, the FACT2000 survey contains questions regarding many
aspects of the congregation’s life. Some areas examined include the number of services
offered at various times, the variety of styles of services, the types of group activities
offered by the church, the effort required to get members to volunteer, and outreach
programs that exist. Each of these series of questions may lend themselves to
considering the price of affiliation via the time or effort that is required to participate.
Thus, we will examine differences between responses from megachurches and nonmegachurches to gain insight into whether the data support the model.
Evidence of Low Prices to Attract Seekers
FACT2000 investigates three questions, in particular, that we argue reflect
evidence of low prices to bring seekers in. The questions ask: 1) about the number of
services offered at different times during a weekend, 2) the variety of styles of services,
and 3) the types of group activities that exist in which attendees may participate.

5

While it may be argued that Historic Black churches may be treated as Protestant, and thus potentially be
included in our megachurch sub-sample, we follow Coreno (2002) and Welch et al (2004)., who argue for a
separate classification for Black Protestant denominations because of the unique historical experience of
black denominations.
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We maintain that a church that offers more services makes it cheaper for
attendance since the potential member can find the time that is most accommodating to
her schedule. In this way the full price of attendance is lowered by providing flexibility
to the individual, thereby reducing the opportunity cost of attendance. The FACT2000
questionnaire asks how many services are offered on Friday, Saturday, Sunday morning,
and Sunday afternoon. We calculate difference of means tests to examine what the
differences between megachurches and non-megachurches. The results are illustrated in
Table 1, below.

Table 1: Services Offered by Megachurches vs. Non-Megachurches

Megachurch
Non-Megachurch
p-value

Friday
0.248
0.187
0.239

Saturday
0.714
0.222
0.000

Sunday AM
2.645
1.221
0.000

Sunday PM
0.787
0.559
0.000

The results show that for Saturday, Sunday morning, and Sunday afternoon,
megachurches offer statistically significantly more services than non-megachurches.
Thus, we conclude that for these three time spans, megachurches succeed in lowering the
price of religious participation and make it easier for seekers to join the megachurch than
the non-megachurch.
Next, we suggest a church that varies the style of service also reduces the price of
attendance as a potential member can seek out the style and social group for which they
are most comfortable. We see both of these aspects as a reduction in the “price” of
attendance along the lines of Miller (2002, p. 445), who analyses the strategies of various
religions and concludes that if a church reduces the demands placed upon potential
customers it can “ease a potential customer into a religious organization.” He uses as
Jewish Community Centers as an example of how an organization may secular activities
as “non-threatening entry points” for disaffiliated Jews. Various styles of services and
various secular-activity groups will appeal to different age groups, ethnicities, and
lifestyles. Ease of entry points reduces the demands on potential members and thus
reduces the price of attendance.
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FACT2000 asks a question for churches that hold more than one service per
weekend, how varied or similar they are. The responses are coded as 1 being very
similar, 2 being somewhat different, and 3 being a very different in style. Table 2 reports
the comparison of results across churches.

Table 2: Styles of Multiple Services of Megachurches vs. Non-Megachurches
Style of Services

Megachurch
1.743

Non-Megachurch
1.094

p-value
0.000

The results again suggest that megachurches are able to attract seekers through lower
prices of attendance via a larger range of styles that are applied to the larger number of
services offered.
Finally, the church that offers group activities centered around a larger variety of
interests makes it cheaper to participate because the larger the variety, the easier it is for a
potential member to link a hobby or personal interest to her church life. Moreover, the
more of these groups that are centered on activities that are typically secular based, the
lower the price of participation the seeker will perceive. For example, if a megachurch
member organizes a running club and invites a seeker (assumed to be a person who
enjoys running) to run, the cost of continued affiliation seems relatively low since the
seeker enjoys running anyhow. Table 3 illustrates the percent of churches that offer
various types of groups that would typically be considered based in a secular interest.

Table 3: Percent of Megachurches vs. Non-megachurches
Providing Secular-Based Group Activities
Type of Group
Community Service
Parenting/Marriage Enrichment
Choir
Performing arts
Book Discussion
Self-help
Fitness Activities
Sports Teams
Youth Groups
Young Adult Activities

Megachurch Non-Megachurch
89%
66%
88%
29%
90%
58%
90%
45%
71%
30%
88%
30%
77%
18%
83%
26%
91%
68%
88%
35%
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p-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

We see that for each and every activity, a larger proportion of megachurches provide the
group activity than non-megachurches, and that the difference is highly statistically
significant. 6 Further, the difference is arithmetically particularly large for secularly based
activities such fitness activities (a 59% difference) and sports teams (a 57% difference).
Taken together, these data may suggest seeker-oriented megachurches have found
a strategy to lower the full price of participation for new attendees. This may, in fact be
one reason that many see megachurches are “religion-lite”, or a spectator religion.
Thumma and Travis (2007), however, argue that this is not the case. They contend that
members of megachurches actually pay a high full price for membership. Ease of entry
remains for members, but the fill price of participation may rise through other costs,
requirements, and commitments.
Evidence of Higher Prices with Deepened Affiliation
The model outlined above predicts that, subsequent to a seeker discovering a good
fit, the church will raise its price. Though data do not exist to make precise comparisons
of prices and costs, FACT2000 does lend itself to finding evidence of whether a
megachurch does increase the full price of increased affiliation with the church.
Specifically, the survey asks three questions that may be employed to test for higher
prices of participation after time has passed and affiliation has deepened. The questions
ask: 1) about the difficulty in getting people to volunteer, 2) about the expectations of
members’ personal practices outside of church, and 3) about the existence of community
outreach programs. We argue that all these activities would be most relevant to attendees
who are further in their process of affiliation, or in the context of our model, are
individuals who already purchased the religious service at a “cheap” price, found a good
fit, and are returning to the megachurch. As their affiliation continues, they become more
involved and through time or effort and therefore pay a higher price for the religious
good.
The first question asks the respondent to characterize the ease or difficulty in
motivating individuals to take leadership roles. Possible responses are that their
6

While it would be preferable to illustrate more details regarding the number of groups relative to the size
of the church, the specific phrasing of the survey questions do not allow more detailed analysis than a
difference of means test.
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congregation does not have any problem getting people to accept volunteer leadership
roles (coded 1), that recruiting volunteers is a continual challenge, but that they do
eventually find enough people (response coded 2), or that they cannot find enough people
to volunteer (response coded 3). Table 4 provides the results.

Table 4: Volunteer Recruiting Efforts of
Megachurches vs. Non-Megachurches

Recruiting Volunteers

Megachurch
1.740

Non-Megachurch
1.930

p-value
0.000

Given that a lower number corresponds to greater ease of recruitment, the megachurches
are able to recruit volunteers easier than non-megachurches. Thus, the price of affiliation
rises given the additional time the attendee volunteers.
The second question asks how much a congregation can expect of an individual’s
behavior outside of church services (i.e. in their home and personal practices). The five
variables examined are personal prayer/scripture studies/devotions/other spiritual
practices, family devotions, fasting, and abstaining from pre-marital sex. The scores
range from 1, associated with “Not at all,” to 5, associated with “A Great deal.” Table 5
provides the results of the difference of means tests.

Table 5: Megachurches Compared To Non-Megachurches
For Emphasis on Personal Practices
Practice
Presonal prayer, scripture study,etc.
Family Devotions
Fasting
Abstaining from pre-marital sex

Megachurch Non-Megachurch
4.65
4.14
3.96
3.44
2.90
2.35
4.00
3.19

p-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

The results suggest that megachurches do have statistically significantly higher
expectations of home and personal practices in each of these categories. As a result, it
can be inferred that the church is again raising the price for its more deeply affiliated
members by expecting more of their behavior outside of church.
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Another manifestation of a higher price of membership may be to engage in group
activities that act as an outreach to the community. For example, volunteering at a soup
kitchen, providing home health services, or engaging in prison ministry. We contend that
participation in such groups demonstrates an individual’s willingness to pay a higher
price for membership to the church. The survey collected information on whether the
church itself, or in conjunction with another organization provided groups across 16
different outreach programs. The responses were coded “1” for “No program,” and “2”
for “Yes program”. The results are provided in Table 6, below.

Table 6: Percent of Megachurches vs. Non-megachurches
Providing Outreach- Based Group Activities

Food Pantry/Soup Kitchen
Cash Assitance
Thrift store
Housing Support
Counseling Services
Substance Abuse Programs
Day Care
Tutoring Programs
Voter Registration/Education
Social Advocacy
Employment Aid
Health Education
Hospital/Nursing Home Facilities
Senior Care
Aid to Migrants/Immigrants
Prison/Jail Ministry

Megachurch
1.982
1.908
1.783
1.743
1.935
1.839
1.743
1.829
1.554
1.561
1.576
1.685
1.694
1.818
1.311
1.863

Non-Megachurch
1.829
1.833
1.573
1.356
1.451
1.320
1.344
1.263
1.231
1.309
1.213
1.304
1.390
1.395
1.119
1.337

p-value
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

The results indicate that across every outreach program, a larger proportion of
megachurches provide the program than do non-megachurches. Consequently, we have
additional evidence of increased price of membership after individuals discover a good fit
between themselves and the megachurch.
Analysis of the FACT2000 survey results suggests that megachurches are, in part,
successfully growing by bringing seekers into the church via a low initial price. This low
price takes many forms. The megachurch offers a variety of services both in number and
style, making it easier to for seekers to enter the church. Moreover, they offer church
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groups, many of which are based on otherwise secular interests. This, too, reduces the
demands on a new attendee to discover whether the megachurch is a good fit. The data
also show that for those that continue their affiliation having discovered a good fit, the
megachurch demands more. The megachurch is able to demand more in terms of
members taking on leadership roles, holding themselves to strict personal standards, and
participating in community outreach groups.

V. Conclusion
Megachurches continue to grow in the marketplace of United States religion as
Americans increasingly assert their ability to switch religions. Megachurches are
significantly different from more established and traditional churches in that they often
have a flexible and modern look, downplay denominational affiliation, and employ
otherwise secular activities in their programming. They also encourage new attendees to
enjoy their services without significant commitment early in their affiliation. Their
growth, thus, seems to contradict a significant amount of the literature that characterizes
strict and high commitment religions as those that will be successful and low
commitment religions as those that will atrophy.
This paper provides an economic model of pricing and quality signaling to
explain the success of megachurches in attracting and retaining members. Megachurches
employ a distinct strategy of reducing the full price of affiliation by providing different
avenues that serve to ease a seeker’s entry to the church, but then raise the full price after
the seeker chooses to become a member. Survey results from FACT2000 illustrate that
megachurches provide more services and a greater variety of styles of services than nonmegachurches, both of which serve to reduce the full price of attendance. They further
ease the entry by offering more church organized activities associated with secular
interests than non-megachurches do. The model demonstrates that as seekers respond to
the lower full price of attendance, a portion of these seekers will find a good fit between
their needs and what the megachurch offers. For those that continue their affiliation and
become members, the megachurch can expect heightened participation and raise the full
price of membership. The data show that, compared to members of non-megachurches,
members of megachurches perceive a higher required expectation of personal practices at
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home which serve to raise the full price of membership. Moreover, a larger proportion of
megachurch members participate in outreach programs than non-megachurch members.
This also indicates an increased full price of membership. Last, megachurches have
fewer difficulties of recruiting volunteers than non-megachurches, suggesting that the
megachurch members are willing to spend more of their time involved with the church,
and consequently pay a higher full price of membership.

Taken together, the data

reflect that megachurches initially reduce the full price of membership to bring seekers to
the church, but are later able to increase the full price of membership for those that have
found a good fit between their needs and what the megachurch offers.
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